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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/CrossPetitioner,

:

v.
Case No. 20060189
WADE MAUGHAN,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

;

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The central issue to be decided by this court is whether there is conflict of
interest that merits the disqualification of defense lawyers in a death penalty case.
Mr. Maughan and his lawyers contend that there is no conflict and therefore no
basis to support disqualification. According to the trial court, there is an
unarticulated "potential conflict" involving the examination of one witness, Randy
Wager. Unarticulated, because the trial court declined to articulate how that
conflict might manifest itself. The court made no factual findings and did not hold
an evidentiary hearing.
Apparently, the court's ruling is that witness Wager was allegedly told not
to speak with police. Wager, however, spoke to the police several times after
contacting them on his own initiative. Wager spoke to police on at least two
occasions and answered questions about Wade Maughan. There were times where
2

he told police he did not want to speak with them for a variety of reasons such as
prior police harassment, police being against Mr. Maughan, and discussions with
defense team members about not talking about the case in general. How this
creates a conflict meriting disqualification is unclear. More importantly, in it's
conclusions, the court did not discuss how this creates a conflict.
The state, in its brief, makes three assertions in support of disqualification:
1. Scott Williams and Richard Mauro made overt admissions that they placed their
interests over the interests of Wade Maughan; 2. Criminal defense lawyers are
always subject to disqualification whenever they are present during interviews
with witnesses and the witnesses later make inconsistent statements; and 3.
Lawyers for poor people have a less important relationship than lawyers for the
affluent and therefore can be disqualified more easily.
As will be discussed below, Mr. Maughan contends that neither Mr.
Williams nor Mr. Mauro ever admitted or implied putting their interests over Mr.
Maughan's. Moreover, there is no conflict of interest. The last two assertions are
simply not supported by existing law.

ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST

A. Motions to Disqualify Should be Viewed with Caution

3

The state proceeds with the notion that there is a valid conflict of interest in this
case.
Nowhere in its brief, however, does it address the well-established principle
that motions to disqualify should be viewed with caution. See Weaver v. Millard,
120 Idaho 692, 819 P.2d 110 (Idaho App. 1991) (motions to disqualify opposing
counsel "should be viewed with caution" as such motions "can be misused as a
technique for harassment."); Gomez v. Superior Court in and for Pinal County,
111 P.2d 902, 905 (Ariz. 1986) (court "views with suspicion motions by opposing
counsel to disqualify a party's attorney based on conflict of interest or appearance
of impropriety."); Lorin v. 501 Second St., LLC, 2 Misc.3d 646, 769 N.Y.S.2d 361,
364 (N.Y.Civ. Ct. 2003)("Disqualification motions are carefully scrutinized
because they seek to deny a party's right to representation by an attorney of his or
her choice and thereby limit a valued right to the party"); Alexander v. Superior
Court, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz. 1984)("only in extreme circumstances should a
party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney client relationship of his
opponent"); State v. Madrid, 468 P.2d 561, 562 (Ariz. 1970)("For the prosecution
to participate in the selection or rejection of opposing counsel is unseemly if for no
other reason than the distasteful impression which could be conveyed.")
Naturally, such motions can be utilized improperly to remove aggressive and
effective advocates. This case illustrates the impropriety of improper prosecution
tactics used to argue for disqualification.
4

The state first argues that defense counsel instructed witnesses not to speak
with police. The witnesses deny that such statements were made. The witnesses
nonetheless spoke with police. The state then argues that Mr. Mauro pretended to
be a television reporter and that Scott Williams might have been a getaway car
driver in an attempt to interview a witness. The state alleged the pair committed
second degree felony communications fraud. The defense, however, proved that
claim to be absolutely false. The state even claimed that David Finlayson, a
lawyer sharing office space with Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams, likely committed
the criminal offense of witness tampering in Spokane, Washington, when Mr.
Finlayson has never been to Spokane and has no involvement in this case. There
have been additional claims of misconduct asserted against lawyers representing
witnesses in Spokane and assertions that lawyers in Utah acted improperly because
witnesses in Spokane retained attorneys. The state has even accused the defense
mitigation specialist of the criminal offense of notary fraud and sought to interfere
with the contract process so that payment to defense counsel would be delayed or
denied.
These claims should be viewed with caution as the vast majority are inaccurate
and made with reckless disregard for the truth. The nature and number of claims
suggests a pattern of personal harassment against the defense team members in an

5

effort to "pin some offense on" them to support disqualification..1 See Monroe H.
Freedman, Lawyer's Ethics in an Adversary System, The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., at 81 quoting Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Second Annual
Conference of U.S. Attorneys (1940)(describing the dangers of prosecutors
"pick[ing] people he thinks he should get rather than pick[ing] cases that need to
be prosecuted").
B. There is no Conflict of Interest
The state goes to great lengths to speak about the discretion trial courts have
in disqualifying counsel. But that decision should be based on articulable facts
that this court can review and scrutinize. Here, there are no articulable facts. The
court merely notes that an arrest of defense counsel appears unprecedented.2 It
then suggests that the arrest has "created a firestorm of controversy" again
ignoring the fact that such controversy might be based on government misconduct.
The court then muses that there is a "continuing possibility of prosecution of
defense counsel in the state of Washington . . .," again, without stating any basis

1

Recently, Durham, North Carolina District Attorney Michael Nifong was
disbarred for making inaccurate public statements about a rape case in his district.
See The North Carolina State Bar v. Michael Nifong, Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline, Case No. 06DHC35. Mr. Maughan
contends that much of the information presented in public pleadings here is similar
to inaccurate public comments made by Nifong in North Carolina.
2

The court fails to state any reference or authority as to why or how it
concludes the arrest is unprecedented, nor did it consider, as asserted by Mr.
Maughan, that it was done for an improper purpose.
6

for that proposition.3 The court then leaps to the conclusion that Utah Rule of
Professional Responsibility 3.4 might have been violated without stating how or in
what manner. Apparently, the lynchpin of the court's argument for
disqualification revolves around the conclusion that "[t]here is a potential conflict
that examination of Mr. Wagar at trial might raise issues which implicate either
Mr. Mauro or Mr. Williams to the defendant's detriment. . .," once more without
explaining, articulating, or identifying what those "detriments" might be.4
The court's subjective conclusion that the arrest was unprecedented and the
resulting "firestorm" do not create a conflict.5 Although the court does not state
how Mr. Wagar's testimony might implicate defense counsel, the state suggests
that anything Wagar might say inconsistent with what he allegedly told police
would make Mr. Mauro, Mr. Williams, Mr. Brown, and Mr. Cilwick potential
3

No criminal charges have been filed in Spokane, Washington and the
matter is now nearly two years old.
4

The state contends that it is "entitled to explore Wagar's biases . . ., [at
which point] the events concerning the witness tampering allegations will become
relevant." It is equally relevant to explore the biases of the police to suggest that
they lied, that they bullied and threatened witnesses, and that they arrested
members of the defense team as a means of preventing access to the witnesses.
Mr. Maughan has filed a second motion for interlocutory appeal claiming that the
alleged confession was coerced and that any order compelling Mr. Maughan to
testify in the trial of the co-defendant should be stayed. Utah Supreme Court Case
No. 10061166. Once that motion is heard in the trial court, police credibility will
certainly be critical to that claim..
5

If an arrest and resulting "firestorm" creates a conflict, police would have
the incentive to arrest defense counsel in every case when confronted by
competent and aggressive opponents.
7

witnesses. The way trials work in Utah and elsewhere in the United States is that
witnesses testify. Those witnesses are then subject to cross-examination. Neither
side "owns" witnesses and oftentimes one or both sides will seek to interview
witnesses before trial. Frequently, those witnesses make inconsistent statements.6
If the witness makes an inconsistent statement, then an independent witness, for
example a police officer or defense investigator, can testify and explain the prior
inconsistency. Rules of evidence everywhere in this country contemplate this very
scenario.
If this Court concludes that the presence of a lawyer at an interview is
grounds for disqualification, then neither prosecutors nor defense lawyers could
ever be present for interviews with trial witnesses. That is not the state of the law
in this country. See Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 224 (Tex. Crim.
1989)("If merely talking with a witness produces a disqualification because there
is a mere possibility that claims of misconduct could be made, then all
investigators, prosecutors, and defense lawyers will invariably be subject to being
removed. That simply and understandably is not the law.").

6

As suggested by the state, there are all sorts of reasons that witnesses
make inconsistent statements. The state claims that the sole reason Mr. Wagar
made inconsistent statements is because he has bias in favor of Wade Maughan.
The state's one-sided view of the evidence does not justify disqualification. There
are, of course, a number of additional reasons Mr. Wagar may have made
inconsistent statements, e.g., memory problems, and police coercion and lies. Of
course, Mr. Maughan contends that Mr. Wagar never told police he was told not to
talk to them and any suggestion otherwise was fabricated by police.
8

II.

NEITHER SCOTT WILLIAMS NOR RICHARD MAURO
ADMITTED NOR IMPLIED THAT THEY PLACED THEIR
INTERESTS ABOVE THOSE OF WADE MAUGHAN THUS
ACKNOWLEDGING A CONFLICT OF INTERTEST.

In its brief, the state contends that Scott Williams "admitted to an actual Sixth
Amendment conflict of interest." State's Brief, at 29. They base this assertion on
a letter Mr. Williams sent to the prosecutors regarding production of discovery in
Mr. Maughan's case. A simple review of the letter, however, reveals no such
admission. On December 15, 2005, Mr. Williams wrote a letter to the prosecutors
referencing three things. First, he notes that any claims of wrongdoing in Spokane
were unfounded. Second, he expressed concerns about the prosecutor's direct
interference in the contract process with the defense team chiefly because the
prosecutors were not parties to the contract and defense had incurred significant
costs in Mr. Maughan's defense.7 Third, Mr. Williams requested the state
immediately provide discovery relating to Mr. Maughan's case and that in light of
the Spokane events any cooperative efforts to share costs had ended. A passing
reference that events in Spokane have "wholly occupied our time" is accurate as
the defense team then, as now, contends the allegations and claims of wrongdoing
were unfounded.
Similarly, Mr. Mauro made no admission that he had placed his interests above
Mr. Maughan's. Again, the state mischaracterizes a letter sent to the prosecutors
7

The prosecution's interference with the funding mechanism has an
obvious chilling effect on counsels' ability to provide effective representation.
9

regarding the arrests in Spokane. On December 27, 2005, Mark Moffat, an
attorney representing Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick, sent a letter to the prosecutors
regarding the arrests in Spokane. That letter was sent specifically to inform the
prosecutors that police actions up to that point have "substantially interfered with
Mr. Mauro's and Mr. Williams' efforts to represent Mr. Maughan." (emphasis
added). Mr. Moffat was clear that an extensive investigation proved no
wrongdoing on the part of the defense team and that continued efforts to
undermine the defense effort would hurt both the defense team personally and Mr.
Maughan:
It is my sincere desire before additional action is taken that due
consideration be given to the issues identified above and the
significant ramifications to the constitutional rights of my clients and
Mr. Maughan. TR, 135
No reasonable reading of these letters would lead to the conclusion that Mr.
Williams, Mr. Mauro, or any member of the defense team placed their interests
above that of Wade Maughan. The state mistakenly equates the natural objections
to the government's misconduct as a basis to state that the defense team placed
their interests above Wade Maughan's. In fact, the record shows the opposite.
The defense team has and continues to make significant efforts to represent Mr.
Maughan by interviewing witnesses, requesting discovery and conducting
mitigation.8
8

Mr. Maughan even filed a petition for extraordinary relief to fund Mr.
Maughan's defense as the trial judge has denied all orders for payment. See Wade
10

The problem with the state's argument is that once police or prosecutors claim
misconduct then the defense team should automatically be disqualified - even if
the allegations are false or made in an attempt to orchestrate disqualification. If
Mr. Maughan did not challenge the accuracy of the state's claim, then the state
would argue for disqualification. Once the defense challenges the accuracy and
truthfulness of the claims, then on the state's theory, they are still subject to
disqualification because they are placing their interests before the client's. The
state's argument on this point lacks merit because it creates an untenable Hobson's
choice. An objection to the allegations results in disqualification because counsel
then places their interests above the client's. No objection to the allegations results
in disqualification because the allegations are deemed true. Here, there is no
admission of wrongdoing by defense counsel and no basis to support
disqualification.
III. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT POOR PEOPLE HAVE A
MORE LIMITED RELATIONSHIP WITH AN APPOINTED
LAWYER THAN AN AFFLUENT PERSON AND THEREFORE
THAT THEIR LAWYER IS MORE EASILY DISQUALIFIED
WOULD SET BAD PRECEDENT
In its brief the state argues that the "Sixth Amendment right to
representation by chosen counsel applies only to non-indigent defendants." State's

Maughan v. Ben H. Hadfield, Supreme Court Case No. 20061110. The state
threatened to file criminal charges against the mitigation specialist who, despite
not being paid, continued to work on Mr. Maughan's behalf by requesting records
and preparing the mitigation workup through March of 2006.
11

Brief, at 16. In the cases cited by the state, the courts state the obvious premise:
"[a] defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford."
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). That statement is made in the
context of accused indigent persons who request representation by a particular
lawyer. Understandably, courts cannot appoint requested lawyers, but rather refer
those persons to public defender offices or appointed panel lawyers. The best
example in Salt Lake County is the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, the
agency to which indigent defendants are referred. Once that office is appointed,
then the accused logically has no right to a particular attorney, but a lawyer is
appointed presumably as part of a rotation process.
The cases do not stand for the proposition that indigent persons should have
a less meaningful relationship with their lawyer than an affluent person. That
would create a two-tier system of justice: one for the rich and one for the poor.
That is a concept that the United States Supreme Court has fought very hard to
avoid. See Gideon v. Wainwright, ill U.S. 335 (1963). The cases cited by the
state are attempting to communicate that indigent persons must accept the lawyer
appointed to them, not that an appointed lawyer is more easily disqualified or has a
lesser attorney client relationship because the person is poor. Justice Brennan in
his concurrence in Morris v. Slappy, discussed this concept:
This ground of distinction, however, is not sufficient to preclude
recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation
by a particular lawyer who has been appointed to represent him and with
12

whom the defendant has developed a relationship. Nothing about indigent
defendants makes their relationships with their attorneys less important, or
less deserving of protection, than those of wealthy defendants . . . . There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. . . . [W]here an indigent defendant wants to
preserve a relationship he has developed with counsel already appointed by
the court, I can perceive no rational or fair basis for failing at least to
consider this interest in determining whether continued representation is
possible.
461 U.S. 1. 22-23 (1983)(Brennan, J., concurring).
A suggestion that the state or court have the authority or power to more
easily remove or disqualify appointed counsel would appear inconsistent with the
spirit and intent of the United States Supreme Court and its recognition of the
importance of appointed counsel in serious felony cases. If this court were to
conclude that it is somehow easier to disqualify appointed counsel merely because
the defendant is indigent, it would seriously undermine the legitimate and effective
efforts of appointed counsel in these cases.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Maughan requests that this court reverse the order of the trial court and
reinstate Mr. Williams as Mr. Maughan's lawyer.

DATED this \U

day of August, 2007.

RfCHARDRMAURO
Attorney for Petitioner Wade Maughan
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